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Introduction: human rights law under threat 
This article deals with political and legal difficulties arising from the integration of 
European human rights law into the UK constitution. 
 Human rights law in the UK (UK) has become a matter of political 
controversy. Powerful elements in the Conservative Party want to remove or at 
least radically reform the duty, found in domestic law, to abide by “Convention 
rights” - the human rights, derived from the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and given “further effect” in the UK under the terms of the HRA 
1998. 
 
Protection of human rights in the UK – the system 
The ECHR is an act of international law. The UK adopts a modified “dualist” 
theory by which treaty-based obligations are not self-executing. If these obligations 
are intended to create rights enforceable in the domestic courts, they must be 
enacted as such by Parliament. Nevertheless the international obligations entered 
into by the UK (including the ECHR) have a persuasive influence on the way in 
which domestic courts interpret Acts of Parliament, develop the common law and 
review the legality of administrative actions.  
 It follows from this that the substantive rights and freedoms listed in section 
1 of the ECHR (articles 2-18) have not been, and still are not, directly enforceable 
in the domestic courts of the UK. The UK’s international obligations under the 
Convention were, and still are, given effect by executive-led prospective changes 
to administrative practices , by the introduction of necessary legislation  and by 
the payment of any sums in “just satisfaction” and legal costs ordered by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). But no one has an enforceable, 
domestic, legal right that such measures be put in place . 
 The HRA 1998 (HRA) came into force in October 2000. It does not make 
the ECHR, as such, part of UK law nor does it give the ECtHR jurisdiction in the 
UK. The HRA is a domestic UK statute applicable only within the “jurisdiction” 
of the UK.  
 The Act gives further effect to Convention rights in domestic law in two 
ways. Firstly, statutes, whenever enacted, must be interpreted “so far as it is 
possible” in a way which is compatible with “Convention rights1”(section 3). This 
is a power solely of interpretation. The courts do not have the power to invalidate 
a statute which cannot be read compatibly – the Act recognises the supremacy of 
Parliament. However, it is a power that the courts can use quite radically. Under 
ordinary canons of statutory interpretation any ambiguities in statutes can be 
                                                 
1 Specifically these are rights listed in schedule 1 of the HRA; they have exactly the same text as in the ECHR. 
resolved in Convention compliant ways, without reference to the HRA. The 
section 3 power, therefore, is used where the words in the statute are clear and 
unambiguous – in the absence of the HRA they would authorise actions 
incompatible with Convention rights2.  However the section 3 power cannot be 
used if the will of Parliament is so clear such that a Convention-compliant reading 
would involve a court “legislating”, doing something different from what 
Parliament clearly intended, not merely interpreting. In these circumstances even 
the UK Supreme Court has no power to invalidate a statute. Section 4 HRA 
authorises the senior courts to make a “declaration of incompatibility” – a 
statement made with judicial authority that a statutory provision is incompatible 
with Convention rights. Such a declaration does not alter the domestic legal 
position of the person under domestic law – they are still denied their human 
rights.  
 Section 3 and 4 create what is often called a relationship of “dialogue” 
between the judiciary, the executive and Parliament3. Using section 4 the courts 
can give a reasoned explanation for why there is incompatibility between a statute 
and Convention rights. The issue then returns to the elected institutions 
(Parliament and the executive). They can change the law to remedy the defect or 
can, because of their view of the public interest, leave the law unchanged.  
 The problem is that this dialogue really only works domestically. A person 
whose position is the subject of a declaration of incompatibility, will have 
exhausted his or her domestic remedies, and is well placed to make an 
application to the Strasbourg court. If it is successful, the UK is obliged, then, to 
change the law or administrative practice. Until now, executive and Parliament 
have responded to section 4 declarations by bringing about such changes. For this 
reason it has been suggested that, despite the absence of a power of direct 
invalidation, the HRA brings about something very close to a system of full 
judicial review on human rights grounds4 - which undermines in practice the 
ultimate supremacy of Parliament.     
 Secondly, the HRA makes it unlawful for a “public authority” to act 
incompatibly with Convention rights and it provides a cause of action and 
remedies for an individual victim. This provision is linked with the Convention: 
public authorities are those bodies for which the state would be responsible at 
Strasbourg5, “victims” are those who could apply under article 34 ECHR and, 
under the Act, and financial remedies are available only under the same 
principles as apply in Strasbourg. 
  
                                                 
2 For a clear account of the judicial approach see Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, paragraph 25-33. 
3 See for example: T. Hickman “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the HRA” (2005) Public 
Law  306 and A.L. Young Parliamentary Sovereignty and the HRA 2009, Oxford: Hart Publishing, chapters 5 & 
6. But dialogue theory remains controversial: A.L. Young “Is dialogue working under the HRA” (2011) Public 
Law 773. 
4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131-2. 
5 Aston Cantlow...v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, paragraph 7. 
The position of the Conservative critics 
The Conservative manifesto in 2010 promised to replace the HRA with a “British 
bill of rights”. The 2010 election, left the Conservative Party governing in 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats who were, and remain, firmly opposed to 
any weakening of European human rights protection.  The best the Conservative 
sceptics could achieve was a Commission to inquire into the desirability of a 
“British Bill of Rights” to replace the HRA6; but this was subject to the proviso 
that any proposals it made had to build on the floor of rights contained in the 
European Convention and not weaken the guarantees in that Convention. This 
proviso, of course, avoided the problem of replacing the HRA with a less 
generous alternative. In that situation applicants could still take their case to the 
Strasbourg Court. So long as the UK remains bound by Article 1 of the 
Convention any adverse ruling from the ECtHR will still need to be put into 
effect. This can only be avoided by renunciation by the UK or radical reform at 
the Council of Europe – the latter not directly within the control of the UK 
government. 
 Experience in government following the 2010 election strengthened 
Conservative opposition to human rights law. Convention derived restraints on 
the deportation of foreign criminals or requirements for review of those on the 
sex offenders’ register were amongst issues which caused press-fuelled political 
storms. At the Conservative Party conference in September 2013 Theresa May, 
the Home Secretary, revived the party’s intention to “scrap” (repeal) the HRA 
and did so without any compensating commitment to a British Bill of Rights. She 
went further and accepted that dealing with the human rights problem might 
require renouncing the Convention – “If leaving the European Convention is 
what it takes to fix our human rights laws, then that is what we will do”.7 
 The Conservative party concern with “human rights” needs to be put into 
the context of more general Euro scepticism in the UK and also populist and 
media distaste for a political and legal position which necessarily protects 
unpopular minorities and individuals. Indeed, the HRA has been controversial 
from its earliest days. In 2006 the Labour Government (which had introduced the 
Act) felt compelled to review its operation.8 The results were generally positive 
but some critical issues were noted. In particular, it was accepted that sometimes 
officials had misunderstood the discretion open to them to restrict “qualified 
rights” (particularly the right to private life in Article 8) and this had led to 
unnecessarily generous applications of rights.  
 The main public criticisms come from elements in the Conservative party. 
The other main UK parties (Labour and Liberal Democrats) remain committed 
to the current system, as do the nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales and 
                                                 
6 Commission on a Bill of Rights – formed March 2011 and disbanded after submitting its final report in 
December 2012. 
7 Theresa May, speech delivered to the Conservative Party Conference, September 30 2013. 
8 Department for Constitutional Affairs Review of the Implementation of the HRA 1996 (July 2006) 
Northern Ireland. There is also plenty of evidence of significant political, popular 
and institutional support for the Act9. Human rights law divides the electorate. 
  
Two constitutional “hypotheses”. 
The critique of human rights cannot be properly evaluated without taking into 
account the major transformation the UK’s constitution has undergone in the last 
five decades. The importance of human rights norms, irrespective of the 
influence of positive human rights law from the Council of Europe, is fully 
recognised in the new constitutional arrangements that have emerged.  
 The traditional “political constitution” has given way to a more legalistic 
“common law constitution”. The process of change has been gradual and 
informal. No deliberate constitutional Act has brought it about. It has occurred 
because changes to political culture have been reflected in the way in which the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers have understood and interpreted their 
own and each other’s roles; and these new interpretations have themselves fed 
back into political culture. It is a theoretical change in the sense that both its 
scope (the extent to which there has been change) and its desirability (the extent 
to which it allows for an acceptable balance of public and private interests) are 
matters of interpretation and controversy. The difficulties over the reception of 
human rights law should be understood in this context.         
 The old, traditional, hypothesis of the “political constitution” has, as its 
central term, the constitutionally unlimited sovereignty of Parliament. 
Constitutionally, Parliament can make laws with any content, including laws which 
violate human rights. However this has always been contrasted with practical 
(political, economic, cultural, etc) limits to Parliament’s legislative freedom. 
These limits are found in constitutional conventions and political practices which 
legitimate resistance to oppressive legislative proposals from the executive10. 
Constitutional conventions, the second pillar of the traditional theory, are rules by 
which offices of state are defined and their powers limited. However, these rules 
are not enforceable through the courts and their authority, in the end, is found 
simply in their acceptance by politicians and officials. Thirdly, on the traditional 
constitutional model, is the importance of the convention of ministerial 
accountability to Parliament11. This is based around the fundamental duty and 
power of Parliament to have and express its “confidence” in the executive which, 
if lost, triggers a general election12. The strength and significance of ministerial 
accountability, as a restraint on power, remains ultimately political. It is not a legal 
duty in the sense of legal norm that can be directly enforced in the courts. 
                                                 
9 See Equality and Human Rights Commission Human Rights Review 2012. Its conclusions support human rights 
and gives a detailed, broadly positive, consideration of the extent to which a human rights culture is embedded in 
the culture of public services in the UK. 
10 See, for example, G. Marshall Constitutional Conventions 1984 Oxford: OUP, esp Chapter 1. 
 
11 E.g. A. Tomkins Our Republican Constitution  2005 Oxford: Hart Publishing, Chapter 1. 
12 Which remains the case today despite the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, see section 2. 
Ministers refusing to account for the actions of their departments may come 
under costly political pressure and, depending on how the Prime Minister 
calculates the balance of political advantage, they would be liable to be dismissed. 
Fourthly, the traditional hypothesis expresses its ultimate character as a “political 
constitution” in terms of the relative subordination of the courts. The rule of law, 
on this view, is assured by a “quietist” judiciary. The common law is subordinate 
to the sovereignty of Parliament, private law, particularly property, is the main 
concern and, given the role and importance of ministerial accountability to 
Parliament, there is no need to develop a strong, interventionist, conception of 
administrative law13. 
 This theory of the “political constitution” has, over recent decades, come 
under sustained criticism from academics, politicians and also judges. It is widely  
agreed that, given the enormous changes the UK constitution has undergone, the 
theory no longer has full explanatory power. A “new British constitution”14 has 
emerged. A “different hypothesis” (different from the traditional account above) 
is necessary to explain the enormous changes to that have occurred over the last 
decades. Any criticism of the human rights system in the UK can be assumed to 
take into account these changes. 
 First and foremost there are important ways in which Parliament, reflecting 
political choices and economic, social and political reality, has voluntarily limited 
its authority. Membership of the EU (on terms which must accept the limitation 
of “sovereign rights”15) and devolution of many powers and functions to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland are the obvious examples16. The HRA, as well, can 
be seen as part of this process. 
 Secondly, Parliament has greatly strengthened the mechanisms by which 
ministers can be scrutinised by Parliament and called to account for their actions 
and the actions of their department. Through, in particular, a reformed and 
strengthened system of “select committees”, it is no longer appropriate to dismiss 
Parliamentary scrutiny as weak and merely partisan17. Through the select 
committee system, in particular the Joint Committee on Human Rights, this 
scrutiny is conducted in a context of awareness of human rights. Of course such 
awareness is limited by the fact that Parliament never loses its partisan character 
(though the select committees are designed to enable a non-partisan perspective 
to emerge) and because Parliament’s main function relates to scrutinising policy 
                                                 
13 E.g. by confining procedural rights (such as the right to a fair hearing) to judicial and not administrative bodies (R 
v Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171), and limiting the power to intervene on the substantive exercise of 
discretionary power only to those situations in which power has been obviously abused (Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223). 
14 V. Bogdanor The New British Constitution  2009 Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
15 NV.Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen [1963] CMLR 105. 
16 Although it remains the case that the applicable legislation (such as the European Communities Act 1972 and 
the Scotland Act 1998) can be expressly repealed; the legislation pertaining to Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland reserves the power of the UK Parliament to legislate even over devolved matters.  
17 E.g. Lord Hailsham “Elective Dictatorship” The Listener 21 October 1976, 496-500. 
and legislating rather than resolving individual disputes. It is when politically 
unpopular individuals are threatened with the loss of their liberty that careful, fair, 
independent, impartial and rule-based scrutiny is required.  
  Thirdly, there is a clear tendency, a “direction of travel”, towards a more 
“legalistic” and written constitution. This is so strong that some commentators 
refer to a “common law constitution” controlled by the law rather than the 
supremacy of Parliament18. For example, a number of constitutional conventions 
have been abolished and replaced by statute19, others have been given statutory 
form20, and others reduced to written form (though not enacted as law)21. 
Likewise, power that was originally authorised by the Royal Prerogative, has 
increasingly been given statutory form22.  
 The most important indicator of this “legalising” tendancy is the 
development of a mature system of “judicial review of administrative action” by 
which the exercise of public power can be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. The 
“quietism” of the traditional, “poltical constitution” has been transformed by a 
series of developments in the common law that date back to the 1960s. First, a 
strong system of procedural rights has been developed. These require fair 
hearings before tribunals and other bodies deciding individuals’ rights but also, 
more broadly, require fairness in the exercise of executive power23. Secondly, 
there are “substantive” grounds on which the legality of executive power can be 
reviewed. The executive must act within its powers, take into account only 
relevant matters and, even if it has taken only relevant matters into account, not 
act unreasonably in the sense of abusing its powers. “Relevance”, “abuse of 
power” etc are obviously open textured ideas whose nature and scope is for the 
judges to decide. Executive decisions are subject to “variable intensity of review” – 
from the most intense examination of the detail of policy to other cases in which, 
unless there is evidence of bad faith or irrationality, an executive action is 
accepted as lawful. The intensity of the review depends upon some (usually 
unstated and implicit) theory of the appropriate relationship of judiciary and 
executive in the particular circumstances of a case. In any event, it is clear that the 
judiciary have developed and expanded the scope of the rule of law and are 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Rawlings, R. “Parliamentary Sovereignty under the new constitutional hypothesis” Public Law 
2006, Autumn, 562-580.  
19 For example, the constitutional convention by which, within a statutory five year limit, the Prime Minister could 
chose the timing of a general election, has been replaced by the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 which, subject 
to exceptions, provides for general elections every five years. 
20 For example, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 gives statutory effect to Parliamentary rules, 
in effect conventions, dealing with the “ratification” of treaties. 
21 For example, the relations between the executive and the judiciary are embodied in the “Concordat” (2004); this 
complements the statutory protection of judicial independence in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
22 For example, the control of the civil service is now based on the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 
2010; the “secret services” were given a statutory recognition by the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994. Notoriously the power to wage war remains with the Prime Minister, acting under the Royal 
Prerogative, though there now may be a constitutional convention requiring the support of the House of 
Commons expressed by Resolution before military action overseas can be udnertaken. 
23 For example: Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (2) [2013] UKSC 39 – the Supreme Court required prior notification 
before the assets of an Iranian bank could be frozen. 
prepared to impose values inherent in that concept to control the exercise of 
executive power in ways that go beyond anything imagined under the 
constitutional practice of the first half of the Twentieth Century.  
 The changes mentioned in the previous paragraphs, taken together, 
describe the new constitutional hypothesis which is the background to criticism of 
human rights law. It is, perhaps, embodied in this statement by a senior judge in 
X v Morgan Grampian [1991] 1 AC 1:- 
 
The maintenance of the rule of law is in every way as important in a free 
society as the democratic franchise. In our society the rule of law rests 
upon twin foundations: the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament in 
making the law and the sovereignty of the Queen's courts in interpreting 
and applying the law. They interpret the will of Parliament and do so on 
the basis of general principles of the rule of law (per Lord Bridge). 
 
 Of course the “rule of law” and its “principles” are problematic and have 
different meanings24. But it is clear that commitment to “human rights” is 
essential. This is partly because of the HRA 1998 which gives express 
Parliamentary authorisation for the courts to develop a human rights 
jurisprudence based on the European Convention. But it is more than that. As 
said above, the language of “fundamental rights” entered the common law, on its 
own authority, in the 1980s25. Reflecting this, the judges have developed a concept 
of “legality”. The effect of “legality” as a principle is that only the clearest, most 
explicit and unambiguous words in an Act of Parliament can authorise executive 
actions which are incompatible with “fundamental rights”. The principle of 
“legality” leaves the relationship of the courts with the executive and Parliament in 
a condition similar to what it is under the HRA 1998. Indeed, any repeal of the 
Act would have no direct impact on this commitment in the common law to 
human or “fundamental” rights. Thus, even without the HRA, executive actions, 
authorised by statute, would still need to conform to judicially imposed human 
rights norms (unless an Act of Parliament could only be interpreted otherwise). 
 Human (or “fundamental”) rights, therefore, now inhabit the common law 
and influence the way in which, through judicial review of administrative action, it 
limits executive power. In addition it is clear that there is something like a 
constitutional convention that Parliament will legislate in a way that is human 
rights aware. Human rights principles tend to be integrated into legislation either 
in the original proposals from the executive or by the executive’s acceptance of 
                                                 
24 See, for example, G. Marshall “The Constitution: Theory and Interpretation” IN V. Bogdonor (ed) The British 
Constitution in the Twentieth Century 2003 London: The British Academy; cf Tom Bingham “The Rule of Law” 
2006 Sir David Williams Lecture, Centre for Public Law, University of Cambridge. 
25 Morris v Beardmore [1981] AC 446.  
human rights amendments coming from Parliament26. Again, if the HRA 1998 is 
simply repealed, this convention, this legislative habit, is likely to remain.  
  
Integration of human rights  
Given these fundamental constitutional changes, it is clear that critics of human 
rights law cannot be seeking a general disapplication of human rights norms from 
the executive. Human rights norms clearly have weight under this “new 
hypothesis”. The critics’ objections are to the form and system by which those 
norms are enforced; they are about the effects of the European system of human 
rights protection in a constitutional system that already gives effect to human 
rights norms. 
 Those for whom the integration of European human rights law is 
unproblematic will deny that there are constitutional tensions. European human 
rights law fits easily into the legalistic, judicially constrained nature of the common 
law constitution described in the previous paragraphs. But human rights critics, 
such as the Conservative critics whose views are mainly the subject of this article, 
are expressing concerns which seem to value elements of the political 
constitution. For them it is not clear that the UK has simply transformed itself 
into a common law constitution. The problematic reception of human rights 
norms indicates the survival of at least aspects of the “political constitution”.  
 
Digression: the left critique of human rights.  
Criticism of human rights law in the UK is politically and constitutionally 
important because it is expressed by the current government and also, as we shall 
see, by senior judges. But there is also criticism from the left. Labour government 
Home Secretaries, especially after “9/11”, were as critical as their Conservative 
successors of some decisions. There is also a more carefully articulated, 
academic, critical position which continues to support the “political constitution” 
and resists the emergence of the “common law constitution”27. This left critique 
sees the HRA as shifting power from an elected Parliament to which the 
executive is accountable to an unaccountable (because independent) and 
unelected judiciary. From this position, the development of human rights law is 
part of a process by which an essentially “political” constitution, based on the 
ultimate supremacy of Parliament accountable to the electors, is being displaced 
by a more legalistic set of constitutional arrangements where final authority on 
what are highly controversial matters lies with the judiciary. They are sceptical of 
judicial claims to the impartial administration of the law. They point out that 
                                                 
26 Section 19 HRA requires ministers presenting a Bill to Parliament to make a statement that the Bill’s proposals 
are compatible with Convention rights or, if they are not, why the Bill should, nevertheless, be supported; the Joint 
Committee (of the House of Lords and House of Commons) on Human Rights reports to Parliament on its own 
independent assessment of every Bill. 
27 E.g. A. Tomkins Our Republican Constitution  2005 Oxford: Hart Publishing. For discussion and criticism of, 
specifically, the position on human  rights see G. Phillipson “The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical 
Essays” 2012 Public Law 380 (publication review).  
human rights norms are often highly controversial. As such they should be 
matters of political discourse rather than matters to be removed from the realm 
of the political. What these critics tend to want is a strengthened Parliament, able 
to represent the interests of all, including the least well off, and able to stand up to 
both executive and judicial power. They see such a Parliament as being more 
effective than the courts in protecting human rights in the light not just of 
individual freedom but also in the light of the norms and discourse of social 
equality.  
 The analysis by the “left” critics of the HRA sees it as “futile”28. The Act is 
good at fiddling at the margins, at protecting the interests of wealthy celebrities 
seeking to protect their privacy, but, they suggest, it has had little significant effect 
in areas where it ought really to matter, in particular, the “war on terror”. Here, 
they argue, the judiciary, have, willingly or otherwise, found it too easy to roll over 
in the face of executive power. Given their powers under the HRA and given the 
particular text and structure of the Convention rights in issue, they have been 
unable to protect fundamental rights against serious challenge by the executive 
pursuing its national security agenda, and this is so, especially, in respect of 
unpopular individuals and minorities who are precisely the people who require 
human rights protection. 
 
Specific issues: the deportation of “Abu Qatada”. 
The deportation of Abu Qatada (Omar Othman) was, more than any thing, the 
focus of Conservative, executive-led, opposition to European human rights29. It  
involved the frequently heard claim that European human rights law inhibits the 
executive in the performance of its basic functions, in particular, the protection of 
the public. But it illustrates a more complex constitutional questioning of the 
reasons for the ultimate supremacy of European human rights law: the domestic 
procedure for deportation already accommodated human rights norms and was 
subject to review on human rights grounds.  
 The UK wished to deport a man believed to give a religious justification for 
violent attacks on civilians30. Initially the deportation was delayed by both UK 
courts and the ECtHR on human rights grounds. One reason for delay was 
because of a real risk, that if deported, Othman would be tortured. After 
diplomatic agreements were accepted as sufficient to remove this risk, 
deportation was further delayed by the ECtHR on the grounds of a real risk that 
Othman would be tried, in Jordan, on the basis of evidence obtained by torture. 
Eventually that risk, that torture evidence would be used, was acceptably removed 
on the basis of a treaty between the UK and Jordan. This whole process took 
                                                 
28 K. Ewing “The Futility of the HRA” 2004 Public Law 828-852; K. Ewing and J-C Tham “The Continuing 
Futility of the HRA” Public Law 668-693. 
29 Theresa May, who is, perhaps, the strongest critic, was Home Secretary at the time. 
30 The conclusion of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission - Othman v Respondent  SC/15/2005, para 79. 
many years, was politically controversial and caused a rift between the UK 
government and the Strasbourg court. 
  In respect of the convention of ministerial accountability to Parliament, 
the deportation of Abu Qatada raised few political difficulties and Parliament was 
broadly in support of the Home Secretary’s actions31.  
 In relation to the legal restraints on executive action, based on the rule of 
law, the situation was wholly different. The Home Secretary used a statutory 
power to deport a person on the grounds that their presence in the UK is 
contrary to the public interest32. Under the original system, in the 1970s, there was 
no appeal to the courts but the deportee could make representations to an 
“independent advisory panel”. This panel was established by the Home Secretary 
using the Royal Prerogative, it had no statutory basis, it acted in secret and its role 
was merely to advise the minister33.  Following an adverse judgment by the 
ECtHR it was replaced by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). 
Like its predecessor, this tribunal has powers to sit in secret and to decide cases 
on evidence which is not disclosed to the applicant. Nevertheless its existence  
demonstrates the changed constitutional culture and acceptance of human rights 
standards of the modern constitution. Unlike the advisory panel, SIAC has the 
status of the High Court and can prevent a deportation if it is unjustified or would 
violate the deportee’s human rights. In relation to secret evidence it uses 
measures which are aimed at counter-balancing34 what would otherwise be a 
breach of the basic human right to an adversarial proceeding. Restricting an 
adversarial process can be compatible with article 5(4) or article 6 of the 
Convention, so long as there are adequate Counter-balancing measures. These 
can include the use of “special advocates”35 which are used by the SIAC and also 
in other contexts in the UK. 
 In the Abu Qatada case SIAC, following a closed procedure, found the 
proposed deportation to be compatible with Convention rights. There was a risk 
that he would be tried, in Jordan, on the basis of evidence obtained by torture. 
Following Strasbourg case law, SIAC had to decide whether the materialisation of 
this risk would, in the circumstances of the case, be a “flagrant” breach of article 6 
ECHR. For the SIAC, whose judgment was upheld by the UK Supreme Court, 
this was essentially a factual matter to be decided by careful examination and 
weighing of the particular evidence in Abu Qatada’s case. It held that, whilst there 
might be violations of article 6 in Jordan these would not, given all the evidence, 
be “flagrant”36. The ECtHR, however, took a different line. The fact that there 
                                                 
31 Sometimes in ways that undermined respect for the rule of law as when some Conservative MPs urged the 
Home Secretary to deport him even without legal authority. 
32 Immigration Act 1971, section 3(5). 
33 See R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs exparte Hosenaball  [1977] 1 WLR 766. 
34 A v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [205] 
35 Security cleared advocates who represent the interests of the applicant. They are entitled to see the secret 
evidence but must not discuss it with the applicant. The European Court gave some support to the use of special 
advocates in Chahal v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413, paragraph 144. 
36 Othman v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2010] UKSC 10. 
was a “real risk” of the use of torture evidence was, of itself, enough to 
demonstrate a flagrant breach of article 6. Once this is accepted a more detailed 
examination of the balance of the evidence was irrelevant. The ECtHR asserted a 
rule – a real risk of the use of torture evidence is sufficient to prevent a 
deportation37. In contrast, for SIAC, the real risk indicated the need for a more 
intensive exploration of the evidence to assess whether, in reality and on balance, 
this risk was so serious as to cause a complete denial of the fairness of Abu 
Qatada’s trial.  
 A similar contrast between European and UK domestic approaches has 
arisen in other contexts such as the use of secret evidence in counter-terrorism 
proceedings  and in the use of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings. The 
Strasbourg Court has tended to protect the essence of a fair trial in terms of a 
determining principle (that evidence based “solely or decisively” on secret or 
hearsay evidence is necessarily a violation) whilst the approach of the UK courts, 
based on common law principles, gives much greater weight to the capacity of 
judges, exercising their discretion, to provide a trial which is, overall, fair38.  
 Thus is one of the points where the integration of European human rights 
with the rights-aware common law constitution seems to falter is when the ECtHR 
lays down an absolute rule. It does this when insisting that allowable interferences 
with the application of rights are limited by the need to guarantee the “essence”, 
the basic entitlement, of a right. The balancing exercise of the domestic courts 
mirrors the approach taken by the executive (though it may come to different 
conclusions). Ultimately this approach is at odds with the more rule bound 
perspective of the ECtHR when it is expounding the limits of allowable 
interference with human rights.   
 
Specific issues: Parliament and prisoners’ votes. 
As well as executive frustration, illustrated by the Abu Qatada affair, a second, 
constitutionally based, criticism of the application of the European human rights 
system in the UK relates to Parliament. It raises the question of the proper 
deference that should be shown, in an human rights context, to the will of an 
elected assembly.  
 As with the application of the rule of law to the executive, discussed in the 
previous section, critics cannot reasonably argue that human rights norms are 
irrelevant so far as the UK Parliament is concerned because of its “sovereignty” 
or merely because it is elected. As said above, the traditional theory of the 
“sovereignty of Parliament” always recognised the limits of culture or “opinion” 
that would restrain Parliament. It saw Parliament was “self-correcting”39 in the 
sense that the effects of oppressive legislation could be remedied through a 
general election. The constitutional convention that Parliament should not 
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39 P.P. Craig Public Law and Democracy in the UK and the USA 1991 Oxford: OUP, Chapter 1. 
legislate tyrannically40 can be restated, today, as requiring Parliament to legislate in 
ways that respect human rights norms. For the courts, only the clearest words in a 
statute can defeat the presumption that Parliament intends to legislate compatibly 
with the UK’s international obligations. And, after all, it was Parliament that 
enacted the HRA 1998. 
 The focus of the tension between the Strasbourg institutions and the UK 
Parliament concerned the UK’s ban on prisoners voting. UK legislation removes 
the franchise from all convicted prisoners. Although the UK courts upheld the 
ban as being within the UK’s margin of appreciation, the ECtHR, held that the 
absolute nature of the ban violated Article 3 of the First Protocol: the ban applied 
to all prisoners, it was applied automatically and it was applied without reference 
to individual factors41. Following this judgment, attempts to enforce the right of 
prisoners to vote through domestic law have failed. This is because, as said above, 
the HRA 1998 does not give UK judges the power to set aside legislation which is 
clearly incompatible with Convention rights; nor do judges have authority to lay 
down any particular scheme for prisoner voting.  
 The ECtHR has repeated its position and made it clear that the UK must 
fulfil its obligation to give effect to the rulings of the Court42. The UK Parliament, 
however, has continued to assert its opposition to prisoners voting43, and this has 
been the position endorsed by the executive. In accordance with the deadline set 
by the European Court, the UK government brought forward legislative proposals 
in November 2012. A Joint Committee of Parliament, considered these 
proposals for a year and, in December 2013, recommended that prisoners 
serving a sentence of 12 months or less should be entitled to vote. Whether this 
becomes law is a matter which, at the time of writing44, is undecided. 
 The ban has three characteristics that may explain why, for its opponents, it 
seems to challenge the democratic authority of Parliament. First, the issue reflects 
the evolutive nature of human rights law. The text of Article 3 of the First 
Protocol does not expressly guarantee a general right to vote, let alone a right for 
prisoners. The right to vote was implied into article 3. For critics it is a 
requirement that has been developed by the European judges on their own 
authority – it is not a necessary inference from the text of 1950. Secondly, as an 
implied or inherent right, it is subject to reasonable restrictions. Over these the 
ECtHR permits a wide margin of appreciation. It therefore recognises that the 
scope of the right to vote is an issue over which reasonable people can disagree. 
The role of the Court is to expound the limits of that disagreement. Thirdly, from 
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the critics’ points of view the Court is imposing an arbitrary rule. It can be agreed 
that the removal of the franchise from those convicted of criminal offences 
should not be automatic but should reflect variable factors such as the seriousness 
of the offence and its circumstances, including the circumstances of the offender. 
But it is exactly these factors that are already taken into account by the judicial 
decision on whether to imprison or not. The Court does not seem open to the 
argument that judicial discretion over whether to imprison or not encompasses 
the same factors as would be relevant to removal of the franchise45.  
 The prisoners’ votes issue is significant because there is wide, cross-party, 
support for the view that the right of an elected Parliament to make laws is being 
improperly fettered by the ECtHR. In so far as generalisation is possible, the 
sense of improper interference relates to issues involving implied or inherent 
rights over which national Parliaments are given a wider margin of appreciation 
and, critics believe, the ECtHR has exercised its reviewing function over such 
issues by imposing an arbitrary rule. Of course there are plenty of MPs who 
either support extending the right to vote to at least some prisoners or who 
support the role of the European Court of Human Rights. For them the 
constitutional position is unexceptional. 
    
The UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. 
There is a third, significant, strand of criticism that comes not from the executive 
or the legislature but is made by some senior judges. It concerns the relationship 
of the UK courts with the ECtHR after the enactment of the HRA in 1998.  
 There have been a number of cases in which a careful and thorough 
analysis of Convention rights by UK courts, including the UK Supreme Court, 
has been disagreed with by the ECtHR. The latter has then interpreted the 
Convention text differently. Examples are cases on the data base of DNA profiles 
held by the police, the policy of random stop and search in the context of anti-
terrorism, and the prisoners’ votes case (mentioned above). There have also been 
tensions over the right to a fair trial and issues such as the right to silence and the 
use of hearsay evidence. The issues may then return to UK courts in later cases 
which must be decided in the light of the Strasbourg approach. It appears that this 
is sometimes done with judicial reluctance46. 
 Under section 2 HRA British courts must “take into account” the 
judgments of the ECtHR court when deciding cases under the HRA. There are 
different judicial views on what this means. The leading judicial interpretation is 
the so-called “mirror” principle. Under this the HRA authorises British judges to 
provide the same level of human rights guarantees as is available from the ECtHR 
– no less (for that would simply encourage any claimant to take his or her case to 
Strasbourg) but also no more: the “mirror” principle equally resists a more 
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generous interpretation of human rights in the UK. On this basis UK courts will 
follow the settled, authoritative statements of Convention law given by the ECtHR 
and will do so even it means overturning their own, recent, carefully reasoned 
analysis of the same Convention rights. The “mirror” principle, however, does 
not require UK courts to follow any particular interpretative line where the 
Strasbourg rulings are not clear or authoritative, where they are based merely on a 
different assessment of proportionality in a particular case, or where they are 
based on a misunderstanding of the domestic legal position47.  
 A number of British judges, including a recently retired Lord Chief Justice 
(the effective head of the judiciary), have begun to suggest that British courts 
could take a more robust, self-assertive, position. In academic writings and 
lectures these judges have criticised the role of the ECtHR48 for acting way beyond 
its original remit of providing a bulwark against totalitarianism. Rather, on this 
view, it has become a constitutional court for Europe which, without proper 
constitutional authority, interferes improperly in the decisions of well ordered 
democracies acting consistently with the rule of law. Other senior judges, also in 
academic writings and lectures, have suggested that there has been too great a 
focus in the case law on Convention rights (which are ultimately defined by 
Strasbourg) and the HRA49. This, it is suggested, has undermined the 
development of the common law. As mentioned above, the common law has a 
strong presumption in favour of negative liberty and, in recent years, has 
recognised its own conception of “fundamental rights”. In the view of these judges 
the common law might, in some circumstances, serve as a better basis for the 
development, in the law, of human rights norms.  
 This sense, that the common law has a parallel strength to the Convention, 
has also been reflected in judicial decisions, where judges must speak with the 
authority of the law rather than their personal opinions. Thus the “mirror” 
principle, mentioned above, has been qualified, in the law, by the view that 
fundamental aspects of British law are not to be overturned by Chamber rulings 
from Strasbourg, and this might also apply even to a clear principle of 
Convention law laid down by the Grand Chamber ( though only as a “theoretical 
possibility”)50. More recently the Supreme Court has emphasised that the 
Convention lays down no more than an abstract range of guarantees and 
underlying values with which domestic law must be compatible. The way in which 
those guarantees and met and values upheld is a matter of domestic law, including 
fundamental principles of the common law. The development and understanding 
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of the domestic law, statute and common law, is, therefore, the primary focus for 
the courts51.  
 There have been cases involving critical and strongly worded 
disagreements between the UK Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights. R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14, in particular, involved the 
Supreme Court criticising Chamber judgments. The latter had suggested that a 
criminal conviction based “wholly or mainly” on hearsay evidence was always 
going to be in breach of Article 6 no matter what other statutory and common law 
safeguards there were52. Likewise, a preference amongst some judges for a 
common law approach, rather than one exclusively grounded in Convention 
rights, can be found in: Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20. 
The claimant argued that the right to “receive information”, in Article 10 ECHR, 
gave him a right to obtain information held by a public body which it, the public 
body, was otherwise unwilling or unable to disclose. In the past, notoriously, the 
right to receive information under article 10 has only applied to those willing to 
provide information but who are prevented by law or government policy from so 
doing. In Kennedy there were two options available to the Supreme Court. One 
was to accept, develop and apply a general, though uncertain, principle, found in 
recent Strasbourg cases. This principle suggests that, in some circumstances, 
article 10 could impose duties of disclosure even on unwilling public authorities. 
But the majority of judges doubted that this new principle had the certainty of 
law. They were unwilling to specify it and develop it as a principle of UK law. 
Instead, the majority preferred to apply the principle of “open justice” found in 
the common law. This, they argued, would provide a solution for the claimant as 
least as good as, and perhaps more generous than, a solution based on article 10. 
The minority, on the other hand, were prepared to accept, adapt and apply the 
Strasbourg developments to the case. 
 As the difference between the judges in Kennedy illustrates, a degree of 
scepticism about European human rights law is not universal. Plenty of judges are 
silent on the issue or welcome the power that the HRA gives them to do justice in 
particular cases and who have no concern about the authority of the ECtHR. 
Nevertheless the sceptical position expressed by senior judges, has found a place 
in the case law and, therefore, is part of the more general critique of European 
human rights law with which this article is concerned. What is also clear from this 
judicial dimension to the criticism is that the issue is not about a reluctance to 
accept human rights norms. In Kennedy the majority thought the common law 
offered a simpler and more certain approach and, also, one which provided a 
potentially more generous outcome or the claimant than available through the 
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Convention. This scepticism is, rather, about the form and content of the 
European approach and the ease with which it integrates with the common law.  
 
Proposed solutions 
The criticisms that have been discussed above are part of the political agenda and 
are likely to stay as live issues past the next general election in 2015. It is the 
Conservatives, from 2010-2015 the dominant party in the governing coalition, 
who are pursuing an agenda for changing the UK’s approach to human rights law. 
The Labour and Liberal Democrat parties support reform whilst not seeking 
radical change.  
  
Repeal of the HRA and renunciation of the ECHR 
Suggested reforms are, firstly, those which relate to the HRA. This is an ordinary 
act of the UK Parliament and so (no matter how fundamental) can be amended 
or repealed by another Act. Repeal or amendment would not necessarily need 
the support of the House of Lords (whose support, even on a major 
constitutional issue, can be dispensed with after a one year delay53). 
 But there would be little point in repeal unless the UK also renounced the 
Convention and withdrew from the Council of Europe. Otherwise there would 
still be cases taken to Strasbourg and still, therefore, the duty on the UK to give 
effect to the ECtHR’s judgments, which critics find so difficult to accept. In any 
case, withdrawal would have huge and unpredictable effects. It is unlikely to be 
possible if there is a coalition government after 2015. Furthermore it might be 
impossible (at least difficult) to do whilst remaining a member of the European 
Union. Under the Lisbon Treaty, membership of the Council of Europe is 
becoming close to being a condition of membership of the EU. Furthermore, the 
Union is itself due to accede to the Convention under Lisbon terms. 
Nevertheless, in 2014, it is one of the options the Conservatives are considering54. 
 
Replacement of the HRA by a British “Bill of Rights”. 
A second area of proposed reform is the replacement of the HRA by a so-called 
“British Bill of Rights” which would be tailored to a distinctly British account of 
human rights based on distinctively British values. This would, presumably, 
involve repealing the HRA and departing from the “mirror” principle(described 
above). The effectiveness of such reform is doubted. Indeed, the Commission, 
set up in 2010 and charged with considering the evidence for a British Bill of 
Rights failed to agree on basic principles. First, there is nothing to stop at the 
moment the UK enacting laws which give effect to an account of Convention 
rights which is more generous to applicants than Strasbourg would be. A more 
restrictive interpretation, on the other hand, would simply lead to applicants 
taking their cases to Strasbourg. A second doubt is whether it is really possible to 
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identify distinctly “British” rights. Human rights theory sees them as fundamental 
and universal entitlements. Such a view sits uncomfortably with the idea of rights 
predicated on national characteristics. Under the Convention, as under all 
international instruments, there is already a well developed concept of the 
“margin of appreciation” by which national differences can be recognised subject 
to the backstop reviewing power of an international court. There is also an 
additional problem in the UK. The whole concept of “Britishness” is in dispute. 
There is an on-going “devolution” of constitutional authority to the “nations” that 
make up the UK55. Indeed the Kingdom is becoming increasingly disunited as 
claims are made on behalf of a distinctly Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish 
culture; and, by default, a distinctly English culture. How all this can be brought 
together in a “British” bill of rights is unclear. Apart from references to jury trial 
most of the debate is about giving rights-based weight to social and economic 
goals such as rights to welfare, housing, etc. This, of course, just raises all the well 
known questions about whether such goals should be expressed as “rights” given 
they involve major questions about social policy and the distribution of resources 
– matters, critics argue, essentially for the political rather than the judicial realm.  
 Nevertheless some concept of a British bill of rights is likely to be in the 
manifesto of the Conservative Party in 2015. In 2010 such a reform was accepted 
by the Liberal Democrat coalition partners but only on the proviso that any 
British bill of rights will build upon, be more “generous” than, the European 
Convention. This would mean that the issues which disturb Conservative critics, 
such as prisoners votes or restrictions on deportation, would remain. So such a 
proviso is not likely to be in the proposals for after 2015.  
 
Reform of the European Court of Human Rights  
The second serious strand of reform relates to the ECtHR. As we have seen it is 
the judgments of this Court, especially when it imposes a rule based limit to the 
exercise of a wide margin of appreciation, that seems to be at the heart of much 
of the criticism. 
 There are agreed to be major problems, mainly based upon the Court’s 
enormous backlog of cases. The Council of Europe and the signatory states 
continue to seek solutions through changes, mainly to the admissions process and 
criteria.  
 But a more efficient Court is hardly the point from perspective of critics in 
the UK. For them the Court is moving too far towards introducing common 
legal/constitutional standards in Europe. This is contrasted to what they allege is 
its original purpose as a bulwark against potential totalitarian policies. It is clear 
that from some of its earliest cases the Court has not confined itself to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights or to state actions which threaten the 
fundamentals of democracy. Rather it has applied human rights norms in a whole 
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range of ordinary matters arising in societies with effective democratic institutions 
and, in some states, long standing democratic traditions. In one of these early 
cases (dealing with the illegitimacy laws of Belgium) the dissenting British judge 
(Fitzmaurice) argued that there was a threshold of severity that needed to be 
passed before an issue would even engage human rights; and that Belgium’s 
domestic rules on illegitimacy failed to meet this. His was a dissenting view. The 
predominant view has always been against confining the jurisdiction of the Court 
to gross violations. Nevertheless the philosophical issue remains: under what 
principle (what philosophy of human rights) do we say this is a matter of such 
fundamental importance that it must be removed from the concerns of the 
national authorities in a functioning democracy? The positive law of the Court 
does not provide an answer. 
 Nevertheless, Protocol 14 has introduced a new admissibility criterion for 
the Court: that the applicant must have suffered a “significant disadvantage”, 
otherwise an application will be refused unless respect for human rights requires 
an examination of the merits. It is unclear at the moment whether this new 
criterion has made much difference. 
 The UK, under the Conservative coalition, played a full role in the reform 
process that has resulted in the opening for signing of Protocols 15 and 16. 
Protocol 15 amends the preamble to the Convention. It affirms the concept of 
“subsidiarity” as requiring the nation states to have primary responsibility for 
securing human rights and that, in so doing, they enjoy “a margin of appreciation” 
but one which remains subject to the “supervisory jurisdiction” of the Court. 
There is no change to the text of Convention rights. The Preamble has persuasive 
authority over how Convention rights are interpreted. However the new text is 
studiedly ambiguous: there is nothing to indicate the scope of the margin of 
appreciation in any situation, nor the intensity of the Court’s supervision. The 
effect may be symbolic rather than real.  
 Protocol 16 will permit national courts to seek advisory opinions from the 
Court. These cannot be general but must be in the context of a case (i.e. not, it 
seems, in the context of a legislative proposal). If the Court accepts the request, 
the opinion will be delivered by the Grand Chamber. These advisory opinions 
are not binding. Protocol 16 may enhance the authority of the national courts; on 
the other hand it may be seen by critics as a means of further restricting the 
independent judgment and development of national law by national courts. 
 The UK pursued other reforms which have not found acceptance. The 
UK’s draft for the Brighton Declaration56 proposed, inter alia, that the Court’s 
jurisdiction should be confined to those issues in which there is a significant 
principle of human rights law at stake or which is such a serious matter that the 
intervention of the Court at the international level is warranted. The UK also 
proposed that, excepting very serious issues, the acceptance by the national courts 
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of an advisory opinion would mean that the right of access to the ECtHR, 
involving the matter of the advisory opinion, would be lost. There is no such 
provision in Protocol 16. The most radical of the UK proposals was to deny the 
right of application where the issue is the same as a matter that has already been 
fully reasoned, in human rights terms, by the highest national court (i.e. a 
supreme or constitutional court). As mentioned above, there are a number of UK 
cases which, had this proposal been in effect, could not have been heard in 
Strasbourg. 
 In the long term, the aim of the proposals from the Conservative 
government is that the Court be put in a position in which it can focus on 
widespread and systematic violations, systemic and structural problems in a 
country’s laws, practices or institutions (e.g. its prisons) and important questions 
of interpretation. The assumption would be that, in well functioning democracies 
characterised by the rule of law applied by an independent judiciary, the role of 
the ECtHR would be much diminished. Its focus would be (as it increasingly is 
anyway) on Russia and eastern European states which are still struggling to give 
effect to these principles - then the Court would be performing the function it was 
created for. Defenders of the current system argue that if the range of the court is 
reduced in this way, democratic countries will cease to be able to show to Russia 
and eastern European states a good example. They fear that, in reality, the Court 
would be neutered. 
 This approach finds some support in the distinction, argued for by 
academic commentators, between “constitutional” and “adjudicatory” functions. 
Constitutional functions involve dealing with cases raising novel issues of law, 
which are important for the state concerned or which involve a serious alleged 
violation. The adjudicatory function is where the main issue in a case is the 
application of settled principles – usually the question of proportionality. It is 
argued that Strasbourg Court should no longer deal with adjudicatory matters - or 
that they should be the exclusive jurisdiction of chambers with the Grand 
Chamber being concerned only with constitutional issues. Whether such 
distinctions are easy to make in practice or whether theyt would lead to endless 
jurisdictional wrangles, is an open question57.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The HRA 1998 is a form of constitutional compromise. It is one of the central 
pillars of the UK’s “new constitution” which has human rights at its centre and 
which has involved a significant rebalancing in favour of the rule of law and a 
more “written” and “legalistic” approach to legitimacy. At the same time the Act 
accommodates aspects of the traditional “political constitution”. Through its 
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recognition of the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament and through the device of 
the declaration of incompatibility, it creates the conditions for a human rights 
“dialogue” between the courts and Parliament and executive - particular over 
complex cases where the balance of rights and public interests is controversial. 
 But the possibility of such “dialogue”, with the necessary possibility that, in 
the end, it is the political judgment of Parliament and the executive that should 
prevail, is inconsistent with the ultimate authority of the Convention and the 
ECtHR. The HRA and the UK’s obligations under the Convention are, to that 
extent, inconsistent with each other. Supporters of European human rights see 
this as unproblematic. They support the new constitutional hypothesis with its 
assertion of the ultimate primacy of “law” over “politics”; the ultimate supremacy 
of the ECtHR is a major feature of this. But for the critics, whose views have been 
the topic of this paper, the problem lies in the Court having the last word (directly 
or indirectly) in the dialogue. They cannot accept a constitutional restraint that, 
albeit ultimately, is legal, juridical and not accountable to the elected Parliament.  
 As has been emphasised, the point is not to deny the significance of human 
rights in a modern constitution – that would involve nostalgia for a constitution 
long since gone. As the examples given above demonstrate, criticism is focused 
on issues where the reasons for the ultimate authority of the ECtHR can be 
doubted and are contestable. These are issues where the authority of the Court 
may be clearly found in the positive law (it is acting consistently with international 
law) but where there are, for critics, reasons to doubt the point of an international 
court having ultimate, dialogue-resistant, authority over the issue. The pressing 
human significance of a right (that it is a “human right”) may be doubted when it 
is merely implied from a more abstract text, and over which a wide margin of 
appreciation is allowed (e.g. prisoners’ votes). If this is so then the reasons for the 
issue to be a matter of human rights, over which an international court has the last 
word, may also be doubted and the positive law which requires this, criticised. As 
the examples given above also suggest, another cause of conflict has been where 
the ECtHR has imposed a fixed, limiting, rule to govern an issue (for example the 
“sole or decisive” rule or the Court’s attitude to the possibility of trial on the basis 
of torture evidence). This absolute approach is inconsistent with a preference 
(characteristic of the common law) for finding fairness through the case-specific 
exercise of discretion. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The 
former, rule-limited approach, is not obviously better than the latter; it is 
therefore unconvincing for international law to exclude the latter.   
 For those supporting the current position, the ECtHR is simply reviewing 
and laying down ultimate limits to the margin of appreciation. This is the job of 
any court with constitutional functions. It is what should be expected given the 
legalistic character of the modern British constitution. Criticism of human rights 
law in the UK suggests that the full extent of such legalism in the UK is 
controversial and that aspects of the “political constitution” remain valued.      
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